My research examines the increasing footprint of governments in financial markets. My current work scrutinizes two applications of this footprint: bank regulation and tax segmentation.
First, I show that the US and China take markedly different approaches to their banking regulation, and this discrepancy carries negative consequences for the long-term dominance of Western banks. In ongoing follow-up work with coauthors, I delve deeper into the institutional characteristics of Chinese banks and the distinct roles of bank supervision versus regulation.
Second, I show that tax exemptions in municipal bonds induce both demand flows and concentration into these bonds. Concentration partially counteracts the effect of flows on credit spreads, so that tax segmentation can be a driver of higher municipal credit spreads in the cross section.
This research builds on my previous work in the Research Department in the International Monetary Fund where, with coauthors, I estimated the cost of public interventions in 2008 to be approximately $3.5 trillion.
I hold a BA in Financial Economics with a concentration in Mathematics, cum laude, from Columbia University.
